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Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse
Act: A Decade in Existence Generates
Judicial Interpretation and New Changes
by House Bill 2026
I. Introduction
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code clearly states that, "A person is
guilty of assault if he . . .attempts to cause or intentionally, know-
ingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . ... - The Code
does not grant an exception to this rule because of a special relation-
ship between the actors. Nevertheless, today as in the past,' society
permits a man to beat his wife without fear of punishment.3 In-
creased public awareness of the problem of domestic violence has
resulted in the enactment of laws throughout the country that pro-
vide for civil proceedings designed to protect women from their abu-
sive spouses." One such law is the Pennsylvania Protection From
Abuse Act8 ("Act") which provides battered women' with a civil
1. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (Purdon 1983).
2. See Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, LAW & POL'Y Q. 382
(1981). Oppenlander gives a history of laws, from English and Roman law, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives, to the American legal tradition of excluding family arguments
from criminal justice intervention. See also D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 25-35 (1976). Mar-
tin discusses the patriarchal family model which has allowed battering of wives.
Some cultures are still largely patriarchal and actually condone wife-beating publicly. For
example, Eisaku Sato, a former prime minister of Japan, prior to his nomination for the Nobel
Peace prize which he received in 1974, was publicly accused by his wife of beating her. Sato's
popularity increased in the Japanese authoritarian and patriarchal culture when his wife an-
nounced that he was a good husband - he only beat her once a week. Flipside of the Japa-
nese Miracle, 3 ALTERNATIVE PRESS DIG. 66 (1975), as cited in MARTIN, supra, at 45.
3. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE FINAL
REPORT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 18-19 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter FAMILY
VIOLENCE]. In a large number of law enforcement agencies, domestic violence calls are given
low priority because of the attitude that such violence is less serious than violence between
strangers.
4. Lerman, A Model State Act. Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
61, 62-3 (1984).
5. Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190
(Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986).
6. The Protection From Abuse Act itself does not limit its availability to women. Al-
though husbands are sometimes the victims of assaults by their wives, this comment refers to
the victim as the wife and the batterer as the husband because the overwhelming majority of
domestic violence victims are female. See Straus, Wifebeating: Causes, Treatment, and Re-
search Needs, in BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, CONSULTATION 463 at 469-70 (1978). The author lists reasons why battered women
must be the immediate focus of social policy: (I) underreporting of violence is greater for
violence by husbands than it is for violence by wives; (2) husbands engage in more dangerous
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remedy for spouse7 assault. The Act was designed to prevent the re-
currence of abuse between family or household members who reside
together. Although the Act seemed comprehensive when it was en-
acted a decade ago in 1976,8 amendments were added in 19789 to
correct problems which were not anticipated. Currently, additional
changes are being examined by the Pennsylvania House Judiciary
Committee in House Bill 2026.10 These changes, if passed, would
further increase the effectiveness of the Act by providing for ex-
tended emergency relief, venue and transfer of orders, court-provided
aid, additional forms of relief, and civil and criminal immunity for
police officers who make warrantless arrests for violations of orders
issued under the Act.
This comment begins with a brief overview of domestic violence
in the United States today. It describes the ineffectiveness of the
criminal justice system in providing remedies for battered women.
The comment then considers Pennsylvania's current Protection From
Abuse Act and judicial interpretation of its provisions. The discus-
sion posits that the current Act must be changed to provide the addi-
tional relief which battered women deserve. The comment then ana-
lyzes the changes to the Act proposed in House Bill 2026. The
comment concludes that even if the legislature passes the proposed
amendments to the Act, practical problems will still remain for bat-
tered women requesting relief under the Act.
II. Domestic Violence: An Overview
A. The Need for Protection
Domestic violence is not a rare phenomenon; it is a social prob-
lem of enormous significance which cuts across all socio-economic
and injurious forms of violence; (3) husbands repeat their violent acts more often than do
wives; (4) research indicates that violent acts by wives are often a self-defense measure against
violence started by their husbands; (5) husbands generally have greater physical strength than
their wives and, therefore, the likelihood of serious injury to the wives is greater than if they
assaulted their husbands; (6) a higher number of attacks by husbands seem to occur when the
wife is pregnant, thus posing a danger to the unborn child; (7) various economic and social
constraints particular to the wives trap them in the marriage and force them to remain with
their abusive husbands. For a discussion regarding the incidence of husband-battering see
Straus, Wifebeating: How Common and Why?, in M. STRAUS & G. HOTALING, THE SOCIAL
CAUSES OF HUSBAND-WIFE VIOLENCE 30-33 (1980), which estimates that 282,000 men are
beaten by their wives each year.
7. Domestic violence is not limited to married couples, and the Act applies to both mar-
ried and unmarried domestic relationships. However, this comment refers to the partners as
husband and wife for ease of reading.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
10. H. 2026 (1986) (Printer's No. 2761).
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lines.1 According to most experts, spouse abuse is a widespread and
serious problem.1 " A recent estimate of spouse abuse states that
every eighteen seconds a wife is beaten in the United States. More
women are injured by their husbands than by mugging, automobile
accidents and rape combined. 13
An oft-asked question concerning spouse abuse is: Why would a
woman continue to live with a man who beats her? No one-line an-
swer exists; rather, many different reasons contribute to each wo-
man's decision to stay in an abusive relationship. Women often re-
main in violent relationships because they are concerned for the
welfare of their children. Many battered women"' lack job skills, ex-
perience and money and are therefore incapable of supporting them-
selves and their children. Ironically, the children the mother is trying
to protect are adversely affected by remaining in the house where the
domestic violence occurs.1 5 Children's attitudes toward other human
beings are colored by the violence they are exposed to at home.
These attitudes may result in future violence by them in their adult
relationships.1"
11. Eisenberg and Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch-22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. RPTR. 138, 144 (1977); FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at II. Contrary to popular
myths, family violence cuts across all racial and economic lines. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 21 (1979). Walker notes that lower-class women are more likely to come in contact
with community agencies and therefore their problems are more visible.
12. M. STRAUS, R. GELLES, & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS-VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 32, 40 (1980) (estimating that 28% of all married women suffer abuse at
the hands of their husbands; at least 1.8 million women are battered by their husbands or
boyfriends). See also WALKER, supra note 11, at ix. Walker estimates that 50% of all women
are battered at some time during their marriages. Estimates of abuse are generally limited to
the incidence of physical rather than psychological abuse, though research often measures
both. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 27-28 (1984). The precise extent of the
problem remains unknown, partly because of underreporting to police and partly because the
statistics do not distinguish assaults between non-strangers from assaults between strangers.
13. Machlowitz, Lawyer in the Aisle: PBS Explores the Hell of Family Violence, 71
A.B.A. J. 120 (June 1985). In addition, wife beating accounts for twenty percent of all police
calls, and forty percent of all serious injuries treated in hospital emergency rooms.
14. "A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without any concern for her rights." WALKER, supra note 11, at xv.
15. Although the Protection From Abuse Act also covers abuse of children, Pennsylva-
nia has enacted a statute, The Child Protective Services Act, which protects children from
parental abuse by requiring persons with knowledge of such abuse to report it to the local
welfare agency. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The procedures
for handling child abuse cases are beyond the scope of this comment.
16. See Star, Clark, Goetz, & O'Malia, Psychological Aspects of Wife Battering, So-
CIAL CASEWORK 479 (1979), as cited by Ramsey, Ohio's Domestic Violence Law, 8 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 895 (1981), stating that domestic violence may even be self-perpetuating, as the
children who witness abuse learn violence and become adults who, in turn, use violence in their
own families; Crites, Our Judges Must Do More to Stem Wife Abuse, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 2,
1985, at 4, col. 3, the author states that family violence plays a significant role in socializing
children to view violence as appropriate behavior, and that up to eighty percent of men who
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A variety of additional reasons exist which often keep women in
abusive relationships: (1) women in our culture are encouraged to
believe that the failure of a marriage represents their own failure as
women;17 (2) the batterer in an emotional plea for forgiveness often
promises to reform;"8 (3) women fear reprisal by their husbands if
they leave;19 (4) battering causes women to have a lack of self-es-
teem.20 For any or all of these reasons, a battered woman may find it
difficult to leave the abusive relationship or even attempt to get help.
B. The Ineffective Criminal Justice System
A major problem faced by a woman who is the victim of spouse
abuse is inaction by the police. The police are often the first outside
authority called by women who are able to request help, but fre-
quently their pleas for help are of no avail. Law enforcement agen-
cies have been accused of treating domestic assaults differently than
non-domestic assaults.21 Police failure to respond adequately to vic-
abuse their wives were victims of violence or witnessed the abuse of their mothers; WALKER,
supra note II, at 57-66, for the impact of violence in the home on children.
17. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 81.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Walker's Cycle Theory of Violence is often used to explain the battered woman's
feelings of helplessness in the violent relationship. Walker's three-stage cycle of violence con-
tains: (I) a tension-building stage, characterized by minor abuse; (2) an acute battering stage,
characterized by uncontrollable explosions of brutal violence; (3) a loving respite stage, char-
acterized by calm and loving behavior by the batterer, and also by his pleas for forgiveness.
WALKER, supra note II, at xv.
21. FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 10-12. The report discusses how the traditional
and current legal response to domestic violence is based on the relationship between the victim
and the abuser. This response has failed to communicate to violent families that domestic
violence is a crime. The report recommends that family violence be recognized and responded
to as criminal activity.
The reluctance of police to respond to domestic disturbances is also supported by the
officers' view of the situations as dangerous to themselves, emotionally charged, and difficult to
resolve. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 91 (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter RULE OF THUMB]. Statistics
tend to support this view. For example, in Pennsylvania in 1982, of the 3806 total assaults on
police, 37% (or 1407) occurred when the police were responding to disturbance calls. These
figures also show the lack of available data on domestic violence; the figures do not distinguish
between stranger and non-stranger assaults. Disturbance calls include family quarrels, man
with a gun, disorderly conduct, and bar fights. Crime in Pennsylvania: Uniform Crime Report,
1978-82, Pennsylvania State Police. This reporting practice limits the ability of police to deal
effectively with domestic assault cases since it limits the amount of available information about
spouse abuse. RULE OF THUMB, supra at 92. In addition, the response of police is limited by
the long-standing common law rule which allows a police officer to make a warrantless arrest if
he has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony, but prohibits a warrant-
less misdemeanor arrest unless the officer witnessed the crime. Many spouse abuse calls are for
misdemeanor assault and battery, and so the officer is precluded from making an immediate
arrest. Gottlieb, Reform in Kansas Domestic Violence Legislation, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 527,
534 (1983).
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tims of spouse assault has been documented in studies which show a
police policy of non-intervention and avoidance of arrest of abusers. 22
This under-enforcement of the law sends a message to both victims
and batterers that spouse assault will not be treated like other
crimes. This inaction contributes to the perpetuation of violence in
the relationship.23 Recently, litigation on behalf of battered women
has attacked this policy of non-intervention by law enforcement
agencies. In turn, this litigation caused some police departments to
adopt new standards and procedures for use in domestic violence
22. See, e.g., Oppenlander, Coping or Copping Out-Police Service Delivery in Domes-
tic Disputes, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1982). A research study of three metropolitan areas
showed a lack of law enforcement in the area of domestic disputes, and included a finding that
police are slower in arriving at the scenes of domestic arguments than at those between unre-
lated disputants. The Police Foundation, Domestic Violence and the Police: Studies in Detroit
and Kansas City (National Institute of Justice, 1977), found that in one city, police had been
called at least once before in 85 % of spouse assault and homicide cases; in 50 % of these cases
the police had responded five times to family violence incidents prior to the homicide. Bowker,
Police Services to Battered Women-Bad or Not So Bad?, 9 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 476
(1982), a study of 146 battered women in Milwaukee found that the wives had asked police to
arrest their husbands in 82% of the incidents, but arrest followed in only 14% of the incidents.
See also MARTIN, supra note 2, at 93-100, illustrating police non-arrest policy in numerous
cities; RULE OF THUMB, supra note 21, at 91, finding by the commission that police tradition-
ally have viewed most incidents of spouse abuse as private matters best resolved by the parties
themselves without resort to the legal process; supra note 3. For a summary of past research
on police policy of non-intervention, see Bell, Domestic Violence: Victimization. Police Inter-
vention. and Disposition, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 525-27 (1985).
Sometimes the policy of police non-intervention is evidenced by written police procedures.
For example, the Michigan State Police Training Academy's procedure for domestic violence
situations provides:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
(1) Complainant must sign complaint.
(2) Must appear in court.
(3) Consider loss of time.
(4) Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
(I) Court not in session.
(2) No judge available.
f. Don't be too harsh or critical.
as cited in Eisenberg and Micklow, supra note 11, at 156-57.
23. Nearly a third of female homicide victims are killed by their husbands or boyfriends,
FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 11, citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation Uniform Crime Reports for 1983. In some instances, the battered woman may feel
forced to kill in self-defense, because the police are of no help and she is unable to leave the
abusive relationship. The theory of self-defense has been used by attorneys representing bat-
tered women charged with murdering their husbands. See Note, The Battered Woman Syn-
drome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986); Buda
and Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J.
FAM. L. 359 (1984-5); Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men
in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To
Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981).
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situations.24
The policy of non-intervention in cases of domestic violence is
not limited to police departments. Prosecutors often hesitate to file
charges against abusers, 5 and criminal penalties seldom reflect the
seriousness of the crimes.2 Even if the criminal justice system effec-
tively responded to the plight of battered women, criminal prosecu-
tion of their husbands would not be a desirable alternative for many
battered wives. Criminal prosecution may involve imprisonment of
the husband, which often removes the family's only source of in-
come.2 7 Moreover, battered women seek to protect themselves from
future abuse, and the slow-moving criminal process does not offer
them the immediate protection they need.28 If the batterer is re-
leased on bail pending trial, the victim may be subjected to renewed
24. Class action suits have been brought against law enforcement agencies for their fail-
ure to respond in domestic violence situations. See Settlement Decree, Scott v. Hart, No. C76-
2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 9, 1979) (out-of-court settlement in which the police department
agreed to treat domestic assaults as it would other criminal conduct and inform victims of
their rights to criminal and civil court proceedings); Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc.2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d (1978),
affd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (upholding the justiciability
of suits against law enforcement agencies for failure to enforce laws against battering men;
declaratory and injunctive relief was not granted because consent judgment was already
entered).
Police agencies that do not arrest are being held liable for failure to protect battered
women. See Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (court denied the
City of Torrington's motion to dismiss Thurman's claim that the non-arrest policy violated the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment; jury awarded Thurman $2.3 million in dam-
ages after finding that twenty-four police officers violated the equal protection clause when the
police officers took more than twenty-five minutes to respond to her call for help; Thurman
suffered partial paralysis and extensive scarring as a result of her estranged husband's attack
which her three-year old son witnessed; the parties settled for $1.9 million); Nearing v.
Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983) (court held that police officers who knowingly fail
to enforce court orders by failing to arrest and take into custody perpetrators of domestic
violence, pursuant to Oregon's Abuse Prevention Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700 et seq.
(1985), may be potentially liable for psychological and physical harm to the intended benefi-
ciaries of the order).
25. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 21, at 93. Prosecutors frequently attribute their low
rate of prosecution of spouse abuse cases to what they believe is the victims' unwillingness to
cooperate, but this expectation in turn tends to discourage victims from using the criminal
justice system because only a few cases ever get prosecuted. See also Lerman, Criminal Prose-
cution of Wife Beaters, RESPONSE 1 (1981). Many prosecutors still believe that family violence
is better handled by social service agencies or domestic relations courts than by criminal
courts.
26. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 21, at 95. See also Crites, A Judicial Guide to Under-
standing Wife Abuse, 24 JUDGES J. 4, 7 (1985). Crites lists reasons why many judges respond
ineffectively to spouse abuse: (I) judicial gender bias; (2) ignorance of the psychological dy-
namics of the crime; and (3) lack of awareness of the seriousness of the crime and the deter-
rent impact judges might have on offenders. Factors such as age, limited turnover, and an
inclination toward traditional attitudes and male dominance of the profession, make a quick
change in judicial response to domestic violence unlikely.
27. WALKER, supra note 11, at 216.
28. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solution, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 263-64
(1971).
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attacks; the batterer may return home angrier than ever and renew
his violent behavior. 29 The woman's fear of reprisal continues for a
long time since the trial may be months away.30
III. Pennsylvania's Civil Remedy for Domestic Violence
Battered women require immediate and adequate legal protec-
tion. Because of the difficulties associated with reliance on the crimi-
nal justice system, many women now turn to civil protection orders
as an alternative. The Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act"' is
an example of such an alternative. The Act provides access to a civil
proceeding whereby the victim of domestic violence may obtain im-
mediate protection, through the court or district justice, from
abuse82 by persons with whom she lives or with whom she has re-
sided, if both parties continue to have legal access to the residence.38
Other remedies, both civil and criminal, are available to a vic-
tim who proceeds under the Act. 3' For example, a battered wife may
file a criminal complaint in addition to requesting immediate protec-
tion under the Act. 8  Furthermore, extra-judicial remedies, such as
shelter services, also remain available, since a battered wife who
must leave the household for her own protection does not jeopardize
her right to relief under the Act.86
The Act does not limit relief to the victim of the violence. A
parent or adult household member may seek relief37 on behalf of
29. Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 534.
30. Id.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986).
32. Abuse is defined by the Act to be the occurrence of one or more of the following
acts:
(i) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing
bodily injury or serious bodily injury with or without a deadly weapon.
(ii) Placing by physical menace another in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury.
(iii) Sexually abusing minor children as defined pursuant to the act of No-
vember 26, 1975 (P.L. 438, No. 124), known as the "Child Protective Services
Law." (11 P.S. § 2201 et seq.).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 10182 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
The definition of "abuse" in the Act was derived from the definitions of simple and aggra-
vated assault found in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code in 1976, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§
2701, 2702 (Purdon 1973), as stated in Note, Relief for Victims of Intra-Family As-
saults-The Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act, 81 DICK. L. REV. 815, 816 (1977).
33. Title 35, § 10182.
34. Title 35, § 10189.
35. For a discussion of the constitutionality of allowing substantive criminal charges to
be filed in addition to the contempt charge see infra text accompanying notes 69-97.
36. Title 35, § 10183.
37. Title 35, § 10189. Proceedings under the Act are to be in accordance with PA. R.
Civ. P. 1901-1905. The action may be commenced either by filing with the prothonotary a
petition alleging abuse by the defendant, Rule 1902(a), or by filing with the office of the
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minor children.38 Under the Act, a plaintiff who for financial reasons
is unable to pay the costs of filing and service to the defendant may
proceed without paying the costs when she files.- 9 However, at the
hearing on the petition, the court will determine if the plaintiff is
indigent; if the plaintiff is not indigent, the court may order the
plaintiff to pay the court costs.
40
Within ten days of the filing of the petition, a hearing must be
held "at which the plaintiff must prove the allegation of abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence. '4 1 At the hearing the defendant must
be advised by the court of his right to be represented by counsel.42 If
a protection order is issued by the court, a copy of the order is given
"to the plaintiff, the defendant and the police department with ap-
propriate jurisdiction to enforce the order." '
The Act permits the court to grant a protection order containing
various forms of relief.4' Relief is not limited to what the battered
woman desires most: ordering the defendant to "refrain from
abuse.' '5 The court may grant exclusive possession of the residence
to the victim.4 The Act also contains provisions which allow the
prothonotary a certified order of the district justice under the emergency relief provision of the
Act, Rule 1902(b). The petition or certified order commencing an abuse action is served on the
defendant by the sheriff or any competent adult, Rule 1903(a).
38. Title 35, § 10184(a). See Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980) (consent of
an abused adult is not required for issuance of a protection order provided that a spouse or
family member is the applicant for such order).
39. Title 35, § 10184(b).
40. Id.
41. Title 35, § 10185(a). See Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Oki. App. 1984)
(the act is civil, not criminal, in nature because the complaining party, not the state, must be
the victim of the abuse, and therefore the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is
not required under the Act, which specifies that the "preponderance of the evidence" test
should be used).
In addition to this burden of proving the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence, the petition must contain specific allegations of actual incidents of abuse which oc-
curred prior to filing the petition for a protection order. These requirements serve to prevent
unjustified and erroneous orders from being issued by the court based on a petition containing
a general allegation of abuse.
42. Title 35, § 10185(a).
43. Title 35, § 10187. This provision requiring police departments to keep copies of the
protection orders on file is very important because many battered women report that their
restraining orders are torn up by the batterer long before the arrival of police. WALKER, supra
note II, at 210.
44. Title 35, § 10186(a).
45. Title 35, § 10186(a)(1).
46. Title 35, § 10186(a)(2). This order is influential in the battering relationship be-
cause the abuser, rather than the victim, is forced to bear the burden of finding alternative
housing, and because the order establishes a clearly enforceable right of the victim, the viola-
tion of which can be easily documented. Buzawa and Buzawa, Legislative Trends in the Crim-
inal Justice Response to Domestic Violence, in A. LINCOLN & M. STRAUS, CRIME AND THE
FAMILY 144 (1985). This provision places the abused spouse in a fairer and more protected
position. However, the Act explicitly states that "[njo order ... under this act shall in any
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court to order the defendant to pay financial support to the plaintiff
and minor children if he has a duty to do so," to award temporary
custody of minor children and to establish temporary visitation
rights.' Any order granted by the court is for a fixed time period up
to one year."
Battered women may seek immediate relief by obtaining a pro-
tection order. The less time it takes to obtain a protection order, the
more effective it is likely to be. Cognizant of this fact, the Act allows
the court to issue any ex parte temporary orders which it deems ne-
cessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse until the court can hold a
hearing.50 No notice is given to the defendant prior to the hearing. 1
Immediate and present danger of abuse must be shown.5 2 Emer-
gency relief is available from district justices when the court is un-
available from the close of business at the end of the week until the
resumption of business at the beginning of the next week.53
If the district justice finds it necessary to protect the plaintiff,
upon a showing of good cause, he may grant any relief available
under the Act, including the exclusion of the defendant from the
household.5 4 Protection orders issued by district justices expire at the
resumption of business by the court, or within 72 hours, whichever is
sooner. 55 At that time, the plaintiff must file for protection with the
court.
Although proceedings under the Act are civil actions, criminal
ramifications will occur if the defendant violates a court order ob-
manner affect title to any real property." Title 35, § 10186(c).
Under Title 35, § 10186(a)(2) the plaintiff may be granted exclusive possession of the
household, whether the household is owned or leased jointly by the parties, solely by the plain-
tiff or by the entireties. If the defendant is the sole owner or lessee, he may be evicted and
possession granted to the plaintiff, or the court may require the defendant to provide the plain-
tiff with suitable alternative housing. Id. § 10186(a)(3).
47. Title 35, § 10186(a)(5). Brookhart v. Brookhart, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 795 (1981), held
that an order of support may be entered against the defendant even though the plaintiff did
not request support in her petition.
48. Title 35, § 10186(a)(4).
49. Title 35, § 10186(b). See Keith v. Keith, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (1984) in which the
court held that an order under the Act may not be extended beyond a one-year period if no
other acts of abuse, as defined by the Act, occurred. In Keith, the court found that while being
in close proximity to their father may cause the children stress, fear and emotional strain, this
did not rise to the level of abuse as defined under the Act. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3111
(Supp. 1982) (the Kansas Protection From Abuse Act restricts the availability of orders to two
per year except in the case of abuse of a minor).
50. Title 35, § 10185(b). For a discussion of the constitutionality of this provision, see
infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
51. PA. R. Civ. P. 1207.
52. Title 35, § 10185(b).
53. Title 35, § 10188(a) and PA. R. Civ. P. 1203.
54. Title 35, § 10188(a) and PA. R. Civ. P. 1208.
55. Title 35, § 10188(b) and PA. R. Civ. P. 1210.
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tained under the Act."6 An officer may make a warrantless arrest,
after verifying the existence of the protection order,57 if he has prob-
able cause to believe the terms of the protection order have been
violated.58 The defendant may be held in indirect"9 criminal con-
tempt by the court for violating the protection order.60 The Act spe-
cifically states that the punishment available for violation of a pro-
tection order includes "imprisonment up to six months or a fine not
to exceed $1000 or both."6 1 The defendant is not entitled to a jury
trial on the charge of indirect criminal contempt.
2
IV. Judicial Interpretation of the Act
The Pennsylvania courts have infrequently interpreted the Pro-
tection From Abuse Act since its enactment a decade ago. Neverthe-
less, very important issues concerning the Act have been raised by
parties and decided by the courts. Defendants in proceedings under
the Act have challenged its provisions on constitutional grounds.
These attacks have proved unsuccessful. Both parties in protection
order actions have encountered procedural hurdles, and Pennsylvania
courts have given guidance on specific issues raised by parties who
were involved in proceedings under the Act.
A. Constitutionality
1. Due Process.-The ex parte provision of the Act allows a
spouse to be temporarily excluded from jointly-owned property with-
out notice and an opportunity to be heard." Any contention that this
provision is unconstitutional appears decisively settled by Boyle v.
Boyle.6" In that case, the defendant argued that the ex parte order
which his wife had obtained violated due process because it deprived
him of property without notice and an opportunity to be heard." The
56. Title 35, § 10190.
57. If the plaintiff does not have a copy of the protection order with her, then the officer
may verify the existence of the order by communicating with the appropriate police depart-
ment, pursuant to title 35, § 10190(c); see supra note 43.
58. Title 35, § 10190(c).
59. Contempt is indirect when it does not occur in the actual presence of the court, or
directly affect a proceeding then in progress. Commonwealth v. Maurizio, 496 Pa. 584, 437
A.2d 1195 (1981).
60. Title 35, § 10190(a).
61. Title 35, § 10190(b).
62. Id. For a discussion of the constitutionality of this provision see infra text accompa-
nying notes 98-100.
63. Title 35, § 10185(b).
64. 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (1979).
65. The due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard are well
established. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). These requirements may be forsaken
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court balanced the defendant's right to due process against the
state's interest in protecting its citizens, 66 and it stated that giving
such notice would defeat the main purpose of the Act: "the immedi-
ate temporary relief of a volatile situation where there is imminent
danger of recurring further abuse of the plaintiff or minor chil-
dren. '"1 7 The court found the defendant's rights of notice and the
opportunity to be heard were subordinate to the abused's right to
immediate protection. Finding no viable alternatives to the ex parte
order, and noting that the resulting exclusion was for a short period
of time, the court held that the Act did not violate the defendant's
right to due process and therefore was constitutional.6 a
2. Double Jeopardy.-Similarly, no constitutional violation of
the fifth amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy occurs
under the Act when, in addition to contempt charges, substantive
criminal charges are filed. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no per-
son shall "be subjected to the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of a life or limb."69 In North Carolina v. Pearce'70 the United.
States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy guarantee con-
sists of three separate constitutional prohibitions: (1) second prosecu-
if there is a need for prompt action, such as when immediate and present danger of abuse is
shown as required by Sections 10185(b) and 10188(a) of the Act. Furthermore, Section
10186(b) of the Act allows the alleged abuser to petition for a modification of the protection
order which will protect the alleged abuser's right in cases where the petitioner fraudulently
sought an exclusion order under the ex parte provision of the Act.
66. The United States Supreme Court, when ruling on a statute which allowed injunc-
tive relief prior to notice and a hearing, stated that deferral of a hearing on deprivation of
property may be permissible if (I) the petition includes statements of specific facts that justify
the requested relief; (2) notice and opportunity for a full hearing are given as soon as possible,
preferably within a few days after the order is issued; and (3) the temporary injunction is
issued by a judge. See Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). This case involved a summary
repossession of consumer goods on default of payments by the buyer. The court balanced the
right of the buyer to notice and a hearing before repossession against the seller's property
interest. Similarly, in Boyle, the court balanced the rights of the parties, and found that the
protection order was necessary to preserve the physical safety of the petitioner.
67. 12 Pa. D. & C.3d at 774.
68. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982). The provisions of
Missouri's Adult Abuse Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 455.010 et seq. (1986), which permit courts
to issue ex parte orders of protection, did not deprive the respondent of due process when the
Act was necessary to secure governmental interests in protection of victims of abuse and pre-
vention of further abuse. See Comment, Ex Parte Protection Orders: Is Due Process Locked
Out?, 58 TEMPLE LAW Q. 843 (1985) for a thorough discussion of state courts' determinations
of constitutionality of ex parte protection orders.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2. The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969). Also, the Pennsylvania constitution provides that "no person shall, for the
same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ... PA. CONST. art. I, sec. 10.
70. 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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tion for the same offense after acquittal; (2) second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense. The double jeopardy clause was examined by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Allen,7 1 which
involved the contempt provision 72 of the Protection From Abuse Act.
The defendant in Allen had previously been convicted of indi-
rect criminal contempt because he had violated the terms of the pro-
tection order which his wife had obtained under the Act. The protec-
tion order required the defendant to refrain from physically abusing,
striking or harassing his wife and their minor children. The defend-
ant allegedly violated the protection from abuse order by forcibly
entering his wife's new residence, then physically abusing and rap-
ing73 her. The wife requested that the defendant be charged under
the contempt provision of the Act. After the contempt hearing, the
defendant was found to be in contempt of the order and was directed
to pay the costs and a fine of $750. Since the contempt proceeding
was criminal74 in nature, the double jeopardy clause was implicated
when an information was subsequently filed containing charges,
based on the same conduct, of simple assault,78 criminal trespass76
and rape.
Allen filed an omnibus pretrial motion to quash the informa-
tion,78 contending that the finding that he was in contempt was a
prior conviction which barred any prosecution on the simple assault,
criminal trespass and rape charges. The defendant asserted that this
71. 322 Pa. Super. 424, 469 A.2d 1063 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 Pa. 500,
486 A.2d 363 (1984), cert denied., 106 S. Ct. 128 (1985).
72. Title 35, § 10190.
73. For a recent discussion of the status of the marital rape exemption in Pennsylvania
see Comment, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania's Place on the Sliding Scale of Protec-
tion from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REV. 777 (1986).
74. The Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that a finding that the defendant was
in contempt of the order was one of criminal contempt, not civil. "[T]he dominant purpose of
the proceeding was to determine whether [the defendant] had disobeyed the order entered
pursuant to the Protection From Abuse Act and, if he had, to punish [him] so as to preserve
the authority of the court and to protect the interests of the general public." 322 Pa. Super. at
431, 469 A.2d at 1067. In addition, title 35, § 10190(a) provides that violators of orders en-
tered pursuant to the Act may be held in indirect criminal contempt.
75. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (Purdon 1983).
76. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503 (Purdon 1983).
77. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1983).
78. This motion was dismissed by President Judge G. Thomas Gates, and the defendant
filed a timely appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, No. 2393 Philadelphia 1980,
appeal from Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Criminal, No. 328 of
1980. The Superior Court granted the defendant's requested relief regarding the simple assault
charge, but remanded for trial on the charges of criminal trespass and rape. 322 Pa. Super.
424, 469 A.2d 1063 (1983). Both the defendant and the Commonwealth appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania.
PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ACT
subsequent prosecution was barred by the principle of double jeop-
ardy. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first examined the appli-
cable statutory provisions of the Crimes Code 7 9 because the court
will consider double jeopardy complaints only if statutory provisions
do not require the grant of the relief requested.
80
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the statutory
compulsory joinder rule,81 which prohibits a second prosecution after
a previous prosecution for another crime which arose from the same
criminal episode, was not applicable in the Allen situation. This rule
was designed "to protect a person accused of crimes from govern-
mental harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for
offenses stemming from the same criminal episode [and], as a matter
of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality without
unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious litigation."82
The court found that neither of these policy considerations was
served by requiring joinder of the contempt charge with the criminal
charges. The contempt proceeding was privately triggered by the
person in whose favor the order was entered; therefore, it did not
involve the governmental harassment that the compulsory joinder
rule seeks to protect against.83 In addition, judicial economy would
not be served by requiring joinder, since either the contempt hearing
would have to be postponed, or the criminal charges accelerated.84
The abused spouse needs prompt enforcement of the order, not the
long delays involved with the criminal justice system. After finding
that the statutory provision did not require the grant of the relief
requested,85 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the de-
fendant's double jeopardy claim. The court held that the constitu-
tional prohibition against double jeopardy did not prohibit criminal
prosecution for simple assault, criminal trespass and rape after the
actor had been found to be in contempt of a previous protection or-
der based upon the same conduct.86
79. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 110 (Purdon 1983).
80. Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 488, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (1983).
81. The compulsory joinder rule, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § l10 (Purdon 1983), was
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in two decisions: Commonwealth v. Cam-
pana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973) (Campana 1],
on remand, Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert denied., 417 U.S.
969 (1974) [Campana I1].
82. 500 Pa. at 489, 458 A.2d at 180.
83. 506 Pa. at 509, 486 A.2d at 367.
84. Id.
85. Furthermore, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107(c) (Purdon 1983) grants an exception
to the compulsory joinder rule in Section 110 when the court punishes for contempt or employs
any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order.
86. 506 Pa. at 511-12, 486 A.2d at 368-9. But see Commonwealth v. Maurizio, 496 Pa.
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The third constitutional protection against double jeopardy, the
prohibition of multiple punishments for the same offense, is pertinent
to the Allen situation in which a prosecution for substantive criminal
offenses follows the defendant's conviction for contempt based on the
same conduct. The test used to determine whether two offenses are
identical for double jeopardy purposes is known as the Blockburger8 7
test. The United States Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Blockburger" that in order to determine whether or not two crimi-
nal charges violate the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he applicable rule
is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires the proof of a fact which the other does not."89 Although
the criminal offenses in Allen arose from the same course of conduct,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania quickly disposed of Allen's
double jeopardy argument on the charges of rape and criminal tres-
pass because each of those charges required proof of a fact which the
finding of contempt did not require.
The court, however, was more perplexed by the charge of simple
assault. The court found the dissent in People v. Gray,a0 a case de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, persuasive in determining
whether criminal contempt required proof of a fact which the other
offenses did not. In the Gray dissent,91 criminal contempt was found
to require the element of willful disobedience of a court order, which
the crime of aggravated battery did not. The dissent stated "con-
tempt retains its distinctive function in specifically protecting our ju-
dicial system from abuse." 92 The finding of indirect criminal con-
tempt in Allen required knowledge of the court's order under the
Act and willful disobedience of that order. This meets the Block-
burger test of proof of a fact which the charge of simple assault does
584, 437 A.2d 1195 (1981), and Cipolla v. Cipolla, 264 Pa. Super. 53, 398 A.2d 1053 (1979)
(Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts, respectively, held that criminal contempt does
have some of the characteristics of criminal offenses and therefore appeal from a finding of not
guilty of contempt would violate double jeopardy).
87. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
88. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
89. Id. at 304.
90. 69 111.2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797 (1977), cert. den. sub. nom., Illinois v. Gray, 435 U.S.
1013 (1978). The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy barred the defendant's prosecution for aggravated battery when the defendant
had been previously convicted for indirect criminal contempt arising out of the same conduct.
The defendant had violated his wife's protection order by striking her with a gun and then
shooting her. See also People v. Gartner, 143 IllI.App.3d 113, 491 N.E.2d 927 (1986).
91. 69 III. 2d at 56, 370 N.E.2d at 801 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
92. 69 III. 2d at 58, 370 N.E.2d at 803.
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not require.' 3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stressed that the purpose of
the contempt order was the protection of the court's dignity and the
enforcement of its order, while the purpose of the criminal charges
was to punish violators of society's norms. The court found that pros-
ecution on the substantive criminal offenses after a finding of con-
tempt did not violate double jeopardy.' 4 If criminal prosecution was
barred by a finding of criminal contempt, the legislative purpose of
the Act would be lost. The Act itself provided that remedies under
the Act are "in addition to any other available civil or criminal rem-
edies."95 If, after a victim of domestic violence proceeded under the
contempt provision of the Act, subsequent criminal prosecutions
were barred, the victim would be forced to choose between her civil
and criminal remedies.
Protection orders are effective deterrents to violence only if they
are enforced. Immediate enforcement of the order by arrest, followed
by prosecution for contempt, provides the victim with the intended
relief, and security as well. In addition, a bar of subsequent criminal
prosecution would dangerously limit the Commonwealth's ability to
punish crime. 96 Such a bar might encourage abusers to continue
their violence, since the only sanction available for violations of the
orders would be indirect criminal contempt. Such violent acts are not
only crimes against the victims, but also are crimes against the state,
which must be able to intervene and hold the actor responsible for
his violence. In Allen the court recognized that a choice between
civil and criminal remedies for spouse abuse should not be required.
Therefore, double jeopardy did not bar Allen's subsequent prosecu-
tion on the charges of simple assault, criminal trespass and rape.97
93. 506 Pa. at 514, 486 A.2d at 370.
94. Id.
95. Title 35, § 10189. In Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), the United States
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause is not violated by multiple punishments
for the same offense or conduct if the legislative intent to impose them is clear.
96. 506 Pa. at 515, 486 A.2d at 370.
97. In Commonwealth v. Zerphy, 332 Pa. Super. 388, 481 A.2d 670 (1984), the defend-
ant contended that double jeopardy protected him from the criminal charges filed against
him-attempted homicide, recklessly endangering another person, aggravated assault, disor-
derly conduct and criminal mischief-because he had previously been held in contempt for
violating the protection order his wife had obtained. The court held that since the basis of the
alleged contempt was actions against the victim of domestic violence and the basis of the
criminal charges was the defendant's actions against the police, the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy was not involved. The defendant had allegedly hit the victim who had
a protection order. The victim then requested assistance from the police. When the police
arrived, the abuser allegedly fired shots at marked police cars.
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3. Right to Jury Trial on Contempt Charge.-The Protection
From Abuse Act implicates another constitutional guarantee because
it explicitly states that a defendant who violates a protection order
does not have a right to a jury trial on the charge of indirect crimi-
nal contempt.98 In Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub,99 the defendant con-
tended that this provision denied him his right to a jury trial,
thereby denying him equal protection of the law. The trial court
found that because of the emergency nature of violations of protec-
tion from abuse orders, the volume of cases of this type, and the
need for efficient and expeditious enforcement of such orders, the
defendant was not denied this right.100 This decision was upheld on
appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which found that the
authorized punishment of up to six months, or a fine not to exceed
$1000, or both, did not entitle the defendant to a jury trial.
B. Procedural Aspects of the Act
Proceedings under the Act are in accordance with Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure 1901-1905, which were adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in order to implement the provisions of
the Act. 10 1 Although these rules control the actions by the parties
during the proceedings, the court has also placed limits on when a
protection order is available, and on what other orders may be
granted during a protection order proceeding. 102
1. Pleadings in Response to Petition.-Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 1904 provides that "[n]o pleading need be filed in
response to the petition." The defendant in Mahorsky v. Mahor-
sky' 08 attempted to file preliminary objections to the plaintiff's peti-
tion for a protection order. Applying Rule 1904, the court held that
preliminary objections were not responsive pleadings and, therefore,
98. Title 35, § 10190(b).
99. 340 Pa. Super. 552, 490 A.2d 918 (1985).
100. 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 59, 67 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa. 35,
305 A.2d 346 (1973), which indicated that when crime prevention measures are taken, there is
no conflict with the right to trial by jury.
101. Title 35, § 10189.
102. PA. R. Civ. P. 1901-1905 were promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on
March 9, 1977, and became effective 15 days after March 26, 1977. PA. R. Civ. P. 1201-1211
were promulgated to implement the Act's emergency relief provision. These rules were adopted
and became effective on March 24, 1977.
103. 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 210 (1982).
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could not be filed by the defendant. 10 4
2. Availability of Appeals From Orders.-Once an order has
been entered, the defendant may appeal only if he files exceptions.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1905 states that the decision
of the court is governed by Rule 1038(b) to (e) inclusive. Rule
1038(d) requires the filing of exceptions to the decision of the lower
court. In Knisely v. Knisely,10 5 the defendant took an appeal from an
order entered under the Act, contending that his actions towards his
wife did not fall within the Act's definition of abuse. Pursuant to
Rule 1038(d), the court held that the defendant's failure to file ex-
ceptions constituted a waiver of the issue he sought to appeal.1 06
Similarly, objections must be timely. In Wagner v. Wagner,107
the respondent participated in a hearing held more than ten days
after the filing of the petition. The Act requires that a hearing on a
petition must be held within ten days after its filing.108 The court
held that his participation constituted a waiver of any objection to
the hearing outside the statutory period, and it stated that any objec-
tion should have been made prior to the hearing itself.109
3. Limitations on Proceedings Under the Act.-In Smith v.
Smith, 10 the court refused to grant relief requested under the Act
because the petition appeared to be a "tactical tool in marital litiga-
tion."" Application of the Act is limited to situations in which there
is a "truly abused and frightened spouse,"11 2 and an order will not
be granted when only tension exists between the parties. In Smith,
the court restricted the availability of protection orders when it
found that the petition was filed not to protect an abused spouse, but
rather for an alternate reason.
The court has also limited the type of orders which may be
granted during a proceeding under the Act. In Rosenberg v. Rosen-
104. Id. at 212.
105. 295 Pa. Super. 240, 441 A.2d 438 (1982).
106. See also Horvat v. Horvat, 303 Pa. Super. 406, 449 A.2d 751 (1982); Lucia v.
Lucia, 318 Pa. Super. 569, 465 A.2d 700 (1983). PA. R. Civ. P. 1038(d) was rescinded effec-
tive Jan. I, 1984. Post-trial relief is now governed by Rule 227.1 which similarly requires that
the party appealing must have timely raised the grounds he is asserting. If no objection is
made by the party appealing, then no grounds exist for post-trial relief.
107. 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 148 (1980).
108. Title 35, § 10185(a).
109. 15 Pa. D. & C.3d at 156.
110. 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 703 (1981).
II1. Id. at 709.
112. Id.
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berg," 8 the court denied a party's request for a permanent order of
custody during a protection order proceeding. Only temporary cus-
tody and visitation rights may be awarded by the court under the
Act. 114 The Superior Court in Rosenberg expressly disapproved of
the granting of orders for permanent custody and visitation rights
with regard to minor children during a proceeding under the Act.
The court stated that the Protection From Abuse Act was enacted to
provide immediate relief to the victim and "was not intended to re-
place the established procedure for determining permanent
custody."'11
5
V. House Bill 2026: Experience Generates Proposed Changes
The Pennsylvania House Judiciary Committee currently is ex-
amining House Bill 2026116 which, if passed, would improve the Pro-
tection From Abuse Act. 1 7 Emergency relief available under the
Act would be extended. Battered women who are not represented by
counsel would be provided court aid in filing petitions for protection.
The Bill would also increase the effectiveness of police by allowing
warrantless arrests when there is probable cause that the terms of
the protection order have been violated and by granting civil and
criminal liability for actions taken in good faith. These changes
would make proceeding under the Act easier for many battered
women. As discussed below, however, many areas still need to be
improved.
A. Relief Unavailable to Some Battered Women
The original Act covered abuse between spouses and between
persons living as spouses. 118 The 1978 amendments extended this to
abuse between household members who formerly resided together
where both continue to have legal access to the residence." 9 A sig-
nificant omission in coverage, however, still remains. Abuse may
113. 350 Pa. Super. 268, 504 A.2d 350 (1986).
114. Title 35, § 10186(a)(4).
115. 350 Pa. Super. at 269, 504 A.2d at 351. See also State ex rel. Duello v. Hoester,
618 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) in which the trial judge was held to have exceeded his
jurisdiction by entering an order pertaining to the dissolution of marriage proceeding when the
parties were before him solely for the purpose of a hearing on adult abuse petition filed by the
wife under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act, Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010 et seq. (1986).
116. H. 2026 (1986) (Printer's No. 2761).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182 (Purdon 1977).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182 (Purdon Supp. 1986). See Vanderhurst v. Rice, 17
Pa. D. & C.3d 225 (1980) (the Act is not applicable where the parties did not "reside to-
gether" or have legal access to the same residence).
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continue between parties who formerly lived together where the
abuse victim has subsequently established a separate residence. Al-
though House Bill 2026 would extend the definition of "family or
household members" to include persons who have been spouses and
persons who lived as spouses, 120 women who are battered after they
leave the residence and no longer have legal access to it would still
be denied relief under the Act. In addition, battering may occur in
relationships in which the parties have never cohabitated. Arbitrary
exclusion of women battered following the dissolution of the domes-
tic relationship limits the effectiveness of the Act in providing a rem-
edy. This provision should be changed to allow relief to as broad a
group of victims as possible. 2 '
Women who are verbally threatened in the home or harassed by
phone calls at the workplace have no physical evidence to show
abuse; nevertheless, they are deserving of protection.'22 The defini-
tion of abuse would be expanded by House Bill 2026 to cover these
women by including the infliction of false imprisonment' 28 as abuse.
Being forced to remain in a house, although no actual offensive
touching occurs, would constitute abuse under the Act. 2 4
Similarly, in order to provide effective protection, the Act
should allow another family or household member to proceed on the
victim's behalf if the victim is unable to do so because of injuries."25
120. The victim is not denied relief under the Act if she leaves the residence to avoid
further abuse. Title 35, § 10183. However, the definition section requires that the victim con-
tinue to have legal access to the residence in order to be covered by the Act. Title 35, § 10182.
121. See Lerman, supra note 4, at 73-74 for model coverage. "A victim of domestic
violence who may be protected under this act shall include any person who has been subjected
to domestic violence . . . by a spouse, former spouse, a parent, a child, or any other person
related by blood or marriage, a present or former household member, a person with whom the
victim has a child in common, or a person who is or has been in an intimate relationship with
the victim." See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (Supp. 1986) (covering persons related by
blood, legal custody, or marriage, any person with whom the victim has a child in common, a
person with whom the victim shares or within the last year shared residence, and any person
with whom the victim maintains or maintained an intimate relationship); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.705(2)(1985) (covering persons related by blood or marriage or persons who cohabitated
within two years of the date of the filing of the petition).
122. Telephone interview with Joseph A. Lashinger, Jr., Pennsylvania House Represen-
tative for Montgomery County (Nov. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Lashinger Interview]. Representa-
tive Lashinger along with other representatives introduced House Bill 2026. Lashinger stated
that difficulty arises in practice because police officers are reluctant to testify for a woman
when no physical injury occurred.
123. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (Purdon 1983).
124. See Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The definition of abuse
in the Minnesota Domestic Violence Act includes "the infliction of fear of imminent physical
harm." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1987). The court held that the use
of that phrase implied that the legislature intended that there be some overt action to indicate
that the family or household member intended to put another member in fear of imminent
physical harm.
125. Lerman, supra note 4, at 84-5.
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Victims of domestic violence may require hospitalization and medi-
cal treatment. Allowing others to request relief for the victim would
reduce the likelihood of repeated violence.
B. Emergency Relief Provision
Currently the Act provides for emergency relief on weekends,
when the court is not available. Family members who are abused
during that time period may seek relief through district justices. Un-
fortunately, most family violence occurs after regular business hours,
not only on weekends, but during the week as well. 1' The victim
should not have to wait until the start of the next judicial day to
obtain a protection order.
House Bill 2026 would remedy this problem by providing for
emergency relief on a twenty-four hour basis. The emergency relief
provision would be extended to allow the victim to file a petition with
a district justice'27 when the court of common pleas is unavailable
from the close of business at the end of each day to the resumption
of business the next morning. " The emergency relief provision also
would allow filing a petition with a district justice during the busi-
ness day, in counties with three or fewer judges, whenever the court
is unavailable because of the judges' duties outside the county, or
their absence due to illness or vacation.
No gaps in relief should occur between the emergency order and
the permanent order, during which time the abuser could continue
his violent actions and the victim could not proceed under the con-
tempt provision of the Act. House Bill 2026 would provide that when
the court schedules a hearing on an ex parte protection order, the
order would automatically continue in effect until the hearing oc-
curs. In addition, the Bill would decrease the possibility that the bat-
tered woman would fail to request a permanent order in time by
requiring the district justice to provide the plaintiff with: (1) instruc-
tions regarding the commencement of proceedings in the court of
common pleas; (2) procedures for initiating a contempt charge if the
126. FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 40.
127. House Bill 2026 refers to bail commissioners along with district justices and Phila-
delphia Municipal Court Judges, and defines such as bail commissioners of the Municipal
Court of Philadelphia. This comment will use the term district justice to encompass all three
emergency relief providers.
128. Correspondingly, such an order would expire as of the resumption of business of the
court at the beginning of the week, or within 24 hours (not 72 hours as before), whichever
occurs sooner. See Lashinger, supra note 122. House Bill 2026 would allow the victim to go to
district justices after business hours during the week because there is a lack of uniformity
among the counties as to when and where judges are available at these times.
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emergency order she obtained is violated; and (3) information re-
garding local assistance programs for domestic violence victims and
the availability of free legal assistance.
C. Venue and Transfer of Orders
Shelters often house abused women from neighboring counties,
although currently petitions can only be filed in the county of the
woman's residency. 1 9 Venue for actions under the Act would be ex-
panded by House Bill 2026 to include "the city where the plaintiff or
defendant resides or formerly resided or in which the plaintiff is em-
ployed or in which an incident of abuse took place."'130 This gives
victims of abuse easy access to the most convenient court without
requiring residency in the county. In addition, House Bill 2026 pro-
vides that if the victim, in order to minimize the possibility of fur-
ther abuse, removes her residence or employment from the county
where the abuse occurred, venue would not be barred in that
county. "' The victim still would be able to file a petition in that
county if she wished.
Under House Bill 2026, once a victim has obtained a protection
order, she would be able to have it transferred to another county.
The court of the county to which a valid order is transferred would
have authority to enforce and modify the order. The court which
transferred the order would still be able to enforce the order, but
would relinquish authority to modify the order. A defendant would
be able to raise objections to the transfer by filing a petition with the
receiving county. When the protection order is transferred, the court
would be required to give notice to "the issuing court, the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the appropriate law enforcement agency in the
receiving county.'
' 3 2
Although this addition of transfer of orders by House Bill 2026
would allow a victim to receive protection in a county other than the
issuing county, she must file a motion for the transfer and await the
actual transfer. Limiting the authority of other counties to enforce
protection orders issued by a county, without the petitioner transfer-
ring it, restricts the effectiveness of the Act. Protection orders should
129. Lashinger, supra note 122.
130. H. 2026 (1986) (Printer's No. 2761). See, e.g. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 821(4) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980) (emergency relief available nights).
131. House Bill 2026 states that venue would not be barred in this situation. However,
the Bill does not state whether the victim has to prove that she left for this reason.
132. H. 2026 (1986) (Printer's No. 2761).
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be effective throughout the state in all counties.1 3 3 Instead of requir-
ing the victim to request a transfer, the Act should contain a full
faith and credit provision.
D. Court-Provided Aid
The Bill would give court-provided aid in filing petitions to fi-
nancially limited women who seek relief under the Act. 3 Anyone
not represented by counsel must be provided with simplified forms
and clerical assistance in English or Spanish to help with writing and
filing the petition. 3 5 The plaintiff also would be advised of her right
to file an affidavit stating that she does not have funds available to
pay the costs of filing and service. In addition, the court would assist
her in preparing the affidavit.' 36 Although free legal services are
available to battered women, the supply is limited and the process
takes time. Most orders are issued under the Act's emergency relief
provision and therefore require immediate attention.
3 7
Court-provided aid would increase the availability of protection
orders to abused spouses who might otherwise hesitate before seek-
ing a protection order because they do not understand the procedure
and cannot afford an attorney. Along with permitting court-provided
aid, the Act should also contain a section explicitly stating that the
clerk of the court shall not render advice or services to parties in
protection order proceedings that call for the professional judgment
of a lawyer.'3 8 This limit on court-provided aid is needed to defend
the Bill against possible claims that the clerk is practicing law,
which is prohibited by the Pennsylvania Code of Professional
133. Lerman, supra note 4, at 78-9. See, e.g. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:l(a) (Supp.
1983).
134. This would be required of the common pleas courts, district justices and the Munic-
ipal Court of Philadelphia. See FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 40 (recommends that
simplified forms and directions for filling them out be available at the courtroom, all police
stations and sheriff's offices).
135. See State ex rel. Patrick v. Kidd, 631 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) in which
the court held that a litigant under Missouri's Adult Abuse Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010
el seq. (1986), does not have to prove to the circuit clerk that she is not represented by counsel
in the proceedings. The litigant need only advise the clerk that she is not represented by coun-
sel, and then the clerk must render assistance as required by the Act.
136. Many states currently allow victims to file petitions without a lawyer and require
the court clerk to assist the victim in filing the petition. See, e.g. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:3(Ill) (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(d) (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-
4 (1984). Some courts must prepare forms usable by lay people. See, e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3602(B) (Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764(2) (1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.025 (Vernon 1986).
137. See Lashinger, supra note 122.
138. Lerman, supra note 4, at 86.
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Responsibility.3 9
E. Additional Forms of Relief
The court would be able to grant additional forms of relief to
the victim under House Bill 2026. The protection order could pro-
hibit the defendant from having contact with the plaintiff not only in
the residence, but also in the plaintiff's place of employment, busi-
ness or school. Battered women are often harassed outside the resi-
dence when the abuser is excluded from the residence.140 Although
not provided for by the Bill, to facilitate police intervention when
such a protection order exists, the plaintiff should be directed by the
judge to carry the protection order with her at all times, thereby
allowing the police to verify its existence quickly. The plaintiff's em-
ployer may also play an important role in protecting her from har-
assment by the abuser while at her workplace. The employer should
be informed of available actions, such as criminal trespass, which he
may invoke against the abuser if he appears at the workplace of the
plaintiff.14'
To make orders granted under the Act more effective, House
Bill 2026 provides that judges who issue the orders 4" should notify
the respondent of the ramifications of a violation of a protection or-
der which grants exclusive possession of the residence to the peti-
tioner. Furthermore, since many batterers, promising to reform, re-
turn to the residence after a protection order has been granted, the
judge should be able to recommend to the victim that she not invite
the respondent to the residence and that she decline any request or
demand by him to enter the residence.14 3 This is not addressed by
the Bill, but it should be included because it might indirectly keep
the abuser from trying to persuade the victim to allow him into the
residence.
139. PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1974). "It is
neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition
of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer . . . . Where this
professional judgment is not involved, non-lawyers, such as court clerks . . . [and others] may
engage in occupations that require a special knowledge of law in certain areas." See, e.g. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit, 19 § 764(2) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.025 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-12(c) (West 1982).
140. Lashinger, supra note 122.
141. Brown, Remaining Problems With the Adult Abuse Act, J. Mo. B. (Dec. 1982)
582, 587.
142. See FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 34 (judges and judicial proceedings are
critical components in ending family violence).
143. Lerman, supra note 4, at 107-108.
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If there has been a prior protection order involving the same
parties, this indicates a scenario in which the respondent pleads with
the petitioner to let him back into the residence, even though she has
been granted exclusive possession. Once inside, the abuser continues
his violent actions, inflicting physical and mental harm on the victim,
who believed the batterer's declaration that he had reformed. Cer-
tainly in this situation, in order to prevent the abuse from recurring,
the judge should be able to prohibit the petitioner from inviting or
admitting the respondent to the residence while the protection order
is in effect. 14 4 This prohibition will inform the petitioner that she
cannot allow the respondent back into the residence, even if he
promises to reform, because the court has prohibited her from al-
lowing him into the residence. She will be better prepared to say
"no" to the abuser's requests for admittance, since she has an order
from the court prohibiting her from doing so. She will be less likely
to expose herself to the danger of further abuse once she has the
protection order. If the abuser does resume residence in the house-
hold, House Bill 2026 explicitly states that the protection order




House Bill 2026 consolidates a battered woman's petition for
protection with her request for recovery of damages she sustained as
a result of the abuse. Because of financial restraints, battered women
often cannot bring a separate civil action against the abuser for
money damages. Under the Bill, the court would be able to order the
defendant to pay monetary damages as an additional form of relief
to a battered woman asking for a protection order.146 This type of
relief would compensate the plaintiff for reasonable losses she suf-
fered as a result of the abuse. These losses could include "medical,
dental, relocation and moving expenses, counseling, loss of earning or
support, attorney fees and other out-of-pocket losses for injuries
144. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(2) (Baldwin 1986) (the court may pro-
hibit the respondent from returning to the residence and may prohibit the petitioner from
inviting or admitting the respondent to the residence while the protection order is in effect).
145. Lashinger, supra note 122. Lashinger stated that police are reluctant to enforce a
protection order when the respondent has resumed residency in the household after the peti-
tioner has been granted exclusive possession by the court.
146. Lashinger, supra note 122. Lashinger stated that a criticism of allowing this con-
solidation is that it creates "a hearing within a hearing." Opponents of consolidation think that
the issues should be dealt with separately. Furthermore, proposed changes to the Pennsylva-
nia's Crime Victims Compensation Board regulations would allow battered spouses to be eligi-
ble for compensation. Previously, the regulations excluded family members, but the change
would allow a battered spouse to receive compensation unless the "offender is living in the
same household as the victim and [would] benefit from the award." 16 PA. BULL. 2141 (1986)
(to amend 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 191.9).
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sustained."1""
Under the current Act, a plaintiff who, for financial reasons, is
unable to pay the costs of filing or service may file an affidavit stat-
ing such, and she will not have to pay unless, at the hearing on the
petition, the court rules that the plaintiff is not indigent. In keeping
with the requirement that the abuser must bear the burden of paying
for the damage he has caused, House Bill 2026 would give the court
a choice of waiving the payment of costs or assigning them to the
defendant.
F. Police Response and the Probable Cause Arrest Act
The current Act allows police officers to make a warrantless ar-
rest if probable cause exists that a violation of the terms of the pro-
tection order has occurred. The violation need not have been com-
mitted in the presence of the police officer. To encourage police
officers to make use of this right, the Bill contains a much-needed
provision which protects the police from civil and criminal liability
for actions taken in good faith and with due care while making a
warrantless arrest.1
48
The Probable Cause Arrest Act of 1986149 has a provision simi-
lar to the Act's, which authorizes warrantless arrests in certain cases
of domestic violence. Warrantless arrests by police were previously
limited to those situations in which a felony was alleged to have oc-
curred, or in which the officer witnessed the misdemeanor offense.
Since most domestic violence constitutes only a misdemeanor 50
under the Crimes Code, immediate arrest of the abuser is precluded
in many spouse abuse situations. 51 Under the Probable Cause Ar-
rest Act, 52 police officers have the same right to arrest a batterer
without a warrant, as in a felony, whenever there is probable cause
147. H. 2026 (1986) (Printer's No. 2761). See also FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at
35 (states that making abusers accountable for their conduct includes financial responsibilities,
and recommends that abusers be required to provide restitution to the victims for expenses
resulting from the crime. See, e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 2302-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766(I)(I) (1981).
148. See, e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134.3(19) (1978 & Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §
13.315 (Supp. 1979).
149. Probable Cause Arrest Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 1986-10, 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 43
(Purdon).
150. N. LOVING, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING-A GUIDE FOR
POLICE 47 (1980). The author states that misdemeanors constitute the bulk of domestic vio-
lence cases.
151. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 21, at 16 (police officers testified that misdemeanor
arrest laws prevent arrest in most domestic violence cases).
152. Probable Cause Arrest Act, supra note 149.
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to believe the defendant has committed simple assault, 153 aggravated
assault, 154 or has recklessly endangered 155 his spouse. Therefore, po-
lice officers may make warrantless arrests in domestic violence situa-
tions when the conduct constitutes a misdemeanor, even though the
officer was not present when the attack occurred. This right is quali-
fied by requiring the police officer to find recent physical injury to
the victim before he can make a warrantless arrest.
The Probable Cause Arrest Act also provides that the arresting
officer shall seize all weapons used by the defendant in the commis-
sion of the alleged offense.' 56 While this covers conduct which vio-
lates the Crimes Code, House Bill 2026 contains an analogous provi-
sion for seizure of weapons when a protection order is violated.
Furthermore, under the Bill, as part of the protection order, the
court might order the respondent to relinquish all weapons used or
threatened to be used either during the alleged violation or in any
prior incident of abuse. To safeguard the defendant's due process
rights,157 House Bill 2026 provides that in either situation the weap-
ons shall remain in the sheriff's possession until the court issues an
order specifying that the weapons should be relinquished, and to
whom they should be relinquished.
In addition, the Probable Cause Arrest Act requires an officer
who arrives at the scene of family violence to notify the victim of
available shelter services, and to inform her that she has the right to
be protected by court order from further abuse. House Bill 2026
does not require these actions by an officer when he responds to a
call for a violation of a protection order. To strengthen the impact of
the Act, the Act itself should require the officer, in addition to ap-
prising the victim of her rights, 158 to assist her in obtaining medical
treatment, if necessary, and shelter services, if available in the
community.' 59
The problem of police discretion as to whether to make an ar-
rest for a violation of a protection order still remains, even with the
change proposed by the Bill. Police officers should have a statutory
153. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (Purdon 1983).
154. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702(a)(3), (4) and (5) (Purdon 1983).
155. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2705 (Purdon 1983).
156. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(b) (Purdon 1983).
157. Lashinger, supra note 122.
158. See, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A § 1-6 (West Supp. 1986) (establishes an
affirmative duty upon police to assist abused spouses and to inform them of their rights and
available remedies).
159. See, e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 2303-4(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (the officer
must also accompany the abused spouse to her residence to remove personal belongings).
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duty to enforce protection orders obtained under the Act, and corre-
spondingly, they should be immune from civil liability for good faith
enforcement. 1' 0 Attitudes of law enforcement agencies towards do-
mestic violence are unlikely to change quickly. A provision for police
training in handling domestic violence would help change these out-
dated attitudes.16 The focus of current police training in domestic
abuse is crisis intervention,162 which fosters the attitude that such
abuse is not a crime. The focus of police training should be law
enforcement.
G. Data Collection
Although the Protection From Abuse Act was enacted over a
decade ago, the general public remains unaware of the extent and
seriousness of spouse abuse."' Only after the magnitude and perva-
siveness of spouse abuse are revealed will the public actively demand
that the legislature and law enforcement agencies effectively respond
to the problem. Accurate and complete data must be collected.' 64
Law enforcement agencies should be required to keep separate
records of domestic violence, including reasons for charges not being
filed. 65 The information gathered may be useful in the particular
court proceeding, and then may become part of the general statistics
on domestic violence. This will increase police accountability, and it
will aid in legislative decision-making, such as the appropriate fund-
ing166 of domestic violence programs.
160. See, e.g. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(1) (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-4-104 (Supp. 1984). See Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(administrator of murder victim's estate set forth a cause of action for denial of the victim's
right to equal protection of the laws under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, where the victim had
obtained a protection order, contacted the city numerous times to obtain assistance pursuant to
such order, and shortly before her death personally informed individual officers of her boy-
friend's continuous harassment and threats of murder and suicide).
161. See generally LOVING, supra note 150; Lerman, supra note 4, at 133-35.
162. Lerman, supra note 4, at 133-34.
163. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE 77 (Jan. 1982).
164. Id. (there is a consistent lack of data collection on spouse abuse).
165. Inside ABA: News Update, Eight-Part Program to Combat Family Violence, 70
A.B.A. J. 145 (April 1984). The proposal also suggested that appropriate government agencies
should collect and analyze data related to the frequency, seriousness, and other characteristics
of spouse assault. See, e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2303-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.9 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770 (1981). See also FAMILY
VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 20 (recommends that officers be required to file written reports on
all reported incidents of family violence).
166. In many states shelter funds are generated through the imposition of a surcharge
on marriage licenses. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 30-6-11 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.01(2)
(West 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.060(4) (1985). But see Boynton v. Kusper, 112 I1. 2d
356, 494 N.E.2d 135 (1986) (the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a $25 surcharge on
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IV. Conclusion
To some extent, spouse abuse will continue to exist no matter
what laws are enacted to prevent its occurrence. Society, however,
cannot allow abusers to go unpunished merely because of the diffi-
culties encountered with domestic violence laws. The Pennsylvania
Protection From Abuse Act was a pioneering law when it was en-
acted in 1976. Spouse abuse has not changed since then, but our
knowledge about it has increased. With this knowledge society is
better able to protect women from threatened abuse. The proposed
changes in House Bill 2026 are a result of the practical experience
gained during the last decade. Although House Bill 2026 would in-
crease the effectiveness of the Act, problems still remain. Unfortu-
nately, only with more experience will these problems be brought to
the attention of our legislators, and the needed amendments be made
to the Act.
Connie Jean Merwine
marriage licenses to fund programs for victims of domestic violence because it violates the due
process clause of the Illinois Constitution).
